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Abstract
We present a macroeconomic agent-based model that combines several mechanisms operat-
ing at the same timescale, while remaining mathematically tractable. It comprises enterprises
and workers who compete in a job market and a commodity goods market. The model is
stock-flow consistent; a bank lends money charging interest rates, and keeps track of equities.
Important features of the model are heterogeneity of enterprises, existence of bankruptcies
and creation of new enterprises, as well as productivity increase. The model’s evolution repro-
duces empirically found regularities for firm size and growth rate distributions. It combines
probabilistic elements and deterministic dynamics, with relative weights that may be modi-
fied according to the considered problem or the belief of the modeler. We discuss statistical
regularities on enterprises, the origin and the amplitude of endogeneous fluctuations of the
system’s steady state, as well as the role of the interest rate and the credit volume. We also
summarize obtained results which are not discussed in detail in this paper.
1 Introduction
Macroeconomic agent-based models are a relatively young strand of research [9], [7], [3], [8]. They
allow to propose microscopic underlying mechanisms that lead to empirically observed statistical
regularities of a macroeconomy, which models starting directly on the aggregate level cannot pro-
vide. They avoid the so-called “fallacy of composition“, since they allow to study interactions.
Macroeconomic agent-based models are often conserving the flow of funds, i.e. they can serve as
a tool to study the role of debt levels, interest flows, or availability of credit on economic activity.
The most important implication of this stock-flow consistency is that the financial condition of
agents plays a central role determining their actions. In that sense, stock-flow consistent models
provide an alternative to efficient markets as a guiding principle of an economic model, where “the
impact of the flow of funds and the stocks of credit and debt are fully reflected in returns and risks
at the individual level”[2]. If, in contrast, agents base their decisions only on their balance sheet,
and do not know the financial condition of others, systemic risk can be present.
Stock-flow consistent models use as main principle the conservation of money. They can be
agent-based, such as [3],[7] and this model, or analytical. Several analytical stock-flow consistent
models describe the money flows between sectors [6], [4]. They exhibit steady state scenarios
where the money flows to and from each sector add to zero. This implies that, if the model is
discrete in time, in one iteration every actor needs to re-inject in the system the money he has
received, be it wages, profits or interest payments. If this does not happen, economic activity will
eventually cease. Regarding enterprises, this phenomenon has become known as the ‘paradox of
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monetary profits’ [1], originally formulated by Marx, stating that enterprises can at most earn
what they have paid in wages. To circumvent this, other models introduce as money flows interest
payments of enterprises to the bank, which is a joint stock company and distributes a dividend
[3], consumption of the bank [6], or dividends of enterprises who are joint-stock companies [7].
The stock-flow consistent model proposed here avoids the paradox of monetary profits because
enterprises spend a part of their gross profits to pay interests on debts to the bank, and the rest
in the goods market. The bank who is the recipient of the interest payments will bear losses from
loans that are not reimbursed whenever an enterprise goes bankrupt. As the simulations show,
in the latter case, money flows do not equal within one iteration, since the accumulation of debts
goes over many iterations. On the long term, each sector will re-inject what he has received, but
this steady state exhibits fluctuations whose strength depends on the parameters of the system.
A major difference to analytical stock-flow consistent models is that agent-based macroeconomic
models allow for the description of competition all markets. [9] and [3] use a price mechanism in
the goods market, the job market and the credit market. In the model proposed in this paper,
competition of enterprises does not happen via prices but due to limited quantities. Enterprises
compete for the available amount of workers in the job market, and for aggregate demand in the
goods market respectively. These market allocations introduce a stochastic term in the dynamics
of the system. In order to be able describe the arising stochastic model theoretically, it needs to
be simpler than the scenario presented in this paper.
In his paper on the history of growth models, J. Sutton revealed two aspects limiting the use of
such simple models [11]: In the past many purely stochastic models had been presented, which do
not attribute any importance to the purposeful behaviour of agents. This has been seen as a flaw
by many economists, who turned towards game-theoretic approaches. Secondly, it can be difficult
to interpret models with very general assumptions. This paper takes a different approach: it
combines the well-understood stochastic model with economically relevant features such as margin
heterogeneity of enterprises, credit constraints, exit of enterprises through bankruptcy, creation of
new enterprises, and productivity increase. These features are in fact complementary and counter-
acting mechanisms, implying that a steady state of the system can be found in which the system
exhibits statistical regularities. Along with the introduction of these features comes the difficulty –
omnipresent in macroeconomic agent-based models – to weight the dominance of the mechanisms
via the choice of the parameters. Not only different empirical datasets, but also different viewpoints
might lead to different choices.
The model studies the coexistence of two mechanisms: on the one hand, a mechanism introduc-
ing a random growth term due to the competition for limited quantities, which on its own yields
an explanation for size distribution and growth rate distribution. On the other hand, a mechanism
comprising growth via the creation of new more profitable enterprises, as well as interest payments
and bankruptcies. We analyze parameter dependencies of the behaviour both on firm level and
on aggregate level. The results of the model are consistent with a number of empirical studies,
but validity of this model could be verified with a multivariate database on firms, and possibly
extended.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the model. In section 3 we show
and discuss numerical results, in section 4 we compare the obtained to existing empirical studies.
Finally, in section 5, we conclude and point at possible extensions and applications.
2 The model
We present here the main elements of the model, whose workings will be introduced successively in
the following sections. We consider three kinds of agents, namely enterprises, workers and a bank.
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Each enterprise is characterized by its margin µi. They all produce the same type of good that is
put in the market at the same price, p. This commodity good is an abstraction of purchases in
the real sector. It is a useful concept to ensure that via limited aggregate demand all enterprises
are in competition, since the decisions of enterprises are governed by their profits. Enterprises
compete only in two quantities, for sales (i.e. the aggregate demand) and for workforce. The
number of hired workers, that depends on the enterprise profits and workforce availability, allows
us to characterize the enterprise size. All workers receive the same wage w per period when hired,
while unemployed workers do not get anything. Enterprises and workers spend their earnings in the
goods market. The bank may lend money to the enterprises, mainly to pay wages, and determines
the corresponding interest rate. Enterprises with large liabilities may go bankrupt, and a constant
flow of young enterprises more or less compensates for these disappearances.
2.1 Main elements
More precisely the system is composed of Ne enterprises (whose number may fluctuate along the
iterations, according to the corresponding setting), Nw workers and the bank:
enterprises i (1 ≤ i ≤ Ne) are characterized by an expected gross margin µi ≡ (expected sales
- wage expenses)/expected sales, that we call just margin hereafter. They produce qi non-
durable goods per period, that are put on the market at a price p. The margin writes as
follows:
µi =
p qi − ni w
p qi
, (1)
where ni is the number of hired workers. In this paper we do not allow enterprises modify their
margins: µi are intrinsic parameters drawn at random with a uniform probability density in
the range [µm ≤ µi ≤ µM ] with 0 < µm < µM < 1. Notice that these expected gross margins
are distinct from the net margin actually earned by enterprises, detailed in equation (20),
which may be negative. The margin (1) reflects the productivity and the technological level
of the enterprise: the higher the margin, the lower the production cost per unit or the lower
the number of workers needed to produce a given quantity.
workers j (1 ≤ j ≤ Nw) may be employed or unemployed. When employed they earn a wage
w per period. Workers do not save, unless they cannot satisfy their demand for goods: like
Godley and Lavoie [4] in their ‘simplest model’, and M. Kalecki [5] in his profit equation,
we assume that workers try to spend all their earnings in the consumption market.
the bank lends money to enterprises at a constant interest rate r, and keeps track of their equities,
which cannot be less than a lower bound ui ≤ 0 that depends on the enterprises’ wage bills:
ui = −γ w ni , (2)
where γ is some positive constant. Enterprises that do not satisfy this constraint are declared
bankrupt.
2.2 Dynamics
The dynamics of the model, visualized in figure 1, is detailed below. We use upper case letters
for aggregate quantities, lower case letters for individual quantities, both for firms i or workers j.
Quantities with a hat (qˆi, nˆi) are initially planned quantities intended by firms before checking
constraints.
at each time step t:
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Figure 1: Scheme of the model. The arrows denote interactions, dotted lines denote money flows.
The numeration corresponds to the numeration in the description.
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1. production decision of enterprises: enterprises calculate their expected production vol-
ume qˆi,t according to their previous iteration sales q
s
i,t−1 and net profits pi
n
i,t−1 (from which
interest payments are already subtracted, see equation (18)). If profits are positive (negative)
they plan to produce more (less) goods proportionally to their net profit ratio per sold unit:
qˆi,t = q
s
i,t−1
(
1 +
pini,t−1
p qsi,t−1
)
. (3)
The number of workers necessary to produce the qˆi,t goods is determined by the intrinsic
margin defined in equation (1)
nˆi,t = qˆi,t (1− µi) p
w
. (4)
2. job market: the aggregate job offers of enterprises
Nˆw,t ≡
∑
i
nˆi,t (5)
may exceed or fall behind the available number of workers Nw. In our simple job market,
workers do not stay at their employer. They are placed anew at each iteration through a
process where job offers and demands are matched at random. If Nˆw,t ≤ Nw every worker has
the same chance of being hired by some firm, but Nw− Nˆw,t workers are left unemployed ; if
Nˆw,t > Nw, each job opening has the same probability of being filled, there is full employment
and Nˆw,t − Nw positions remain vacant. Depending on availability each firm i will hire a
number of workers
ni,t = nˆi,t if Nˆw,t ≤ Nw (6)
〈ni,t〉 = nˆi,t Nw
Nˆw,t
if Nˆw,t > Nw . (7)
It is useful to define an effective µ of the system, which is the average µ at which the workers
are hired:
µeff,t =
1
Nw
∑
i
ni,t µi. (8)
Its time evolution will allow us to characterize the dynamics of the system.
3. credit market: once the number of hired workers ni,t is known, each enterprise calculates
whether its owned equities ei,t are sufficient to pay the corresponding wages. If necessary,
it takes out a loan of amount li,t from the bank. The latter determines the interest rate r,
which in the following is assumed to be time independent and the same for all the enterprises.
The borrowed amount takes into account the interests to be included upon repayment of the
debt:
li,t = [ni,t w − ei,t] (1 + r) (9)
4. production: the amount of goods qi,t actually produced by the ni,t workers hired by firm i
(and put in the market) is given by equation:
qi,t =
w
p
ni,t
1− µi , (10)
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so firms with a higher µi produce more goods per worker. The aggregate output Qt is
Qt =
∑
i
qi,t. (11)
5. consumption decision: workers j intend to spend their wages, which allow them to buy a
quantity given by:
dj,t =
{
w
p if employed
0 otherwise
(12)
Firms i intend to spend their expected profits:
di,t =
pini,t
p
(13)
The bank does not act as a consumer (as is done e.g. in [6]), it can merely lose money when
enterprises go bankrupt, which compensates for its interest revenues. Thus, the aggregate
demand is:
Dt =
∑
j
dj,t +
∑
i
di,t. (14)
6. commodity goods market: in the case of excess production, the overall offer (11) exceeds
aggregate demand (14), i.e. Qt > Dt. We assume that each commodity good has the same
chance of being sold. This is the situation mainly considered in the present paper. If Dt > Qt,
all the production is sold leaving some demands unsatisfied. Each demand – whether coming
from enterprises or workers – has the same chance of being fulfilled and the agents (workers
or enterprises) may save and eventually spend their savings in the next iteration. (However,
in the simulations presented in this paper holds Qt > Dt). Notice that Qt and Dt need not
be known to the enterprises or workers; they experience if their offer and demand are satisfied
by a matching algorithm. Sales of enterprise i are
qsi,t = qi,t if Qt < Dt (15)〈
qsi,t
〉
= qi,t
Dt
Qt
if Qt > Dt , (16)
In the second case where enterprises face a random constraint due to limited aggregate
demand, unsold goods are lost. In that case the realized gross margin (see eq. (17) may
be lower than the intrinsic margin µi, and even be negative, as is the case in the examples
shown in this paper in figure 3. (Sales in monetary units are p qsi,t.)
7. enterprises balance sheet accounting: firms must pay interests on the whole amount of
their loans, i.e. current lending and accumulated old debts. If they have enough assets, they
repay the loans at the end of the iteration; if the liabilities exceed the assets, they start the
next iteration with a negative net equity.
In order to prepare the production decision of the next period, firms calculate their gross
and net realized profit pigi,t and pi
n
i,t (which are identical if r=0), defined respectively by
pigi,t = q
s
i,t p− ni,t w, (17)
pini,t = q
s
i,t p− ni,t w − li,t r. (18)
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Notice that the normalized gross profit pigi,t/(q
s
i,t p) is not necessarily identical to the margin
µi, which is only reached if all the produced goods are sold. The gross and net realized
margins of an enterprise
µgi,t = pi
g
i,t/(q
s
i,t p) , (19)
µni,t = pi
n
i,t/(q
s
i,t p) (20)
are ≤ µi and can both take negative values.
8. bankruptcy and new enterprises: enterprises whose equities after repayment of loans
(as far as repayment is possible) fall below the threshold defined by eq. (2) are declared
bankrupt, and are removed from the system. Their (negative) equities are losses to the bank.
In order to avoid a decline in the number of enterprises due to bankruptcies, we introduce a
small number of new enterprises at each iteration. Notice that this differs from the approach
by Bruun [7] and DelliGatti et al. [9], who both replace systematically each bankrupt enter-
prise by a new one, keeping thus the total number of enterprises constant. In our model new
enterprises are started at a constant rate ν per iteration, with an initial number of workers
(ni,init) drawn at random between 1 and 3, and a margin µi drawn at random within the
same range of margins as the initial enterprises. With this procedure the total number of
enterprises fluctuates upon time.
In order to endow new enterprises with the possibility to grow faster than existing enter-
prises and thus slowly displace them, the margin of existing enterprises is recentered at each
iteration before new firms are started, such that the new enterprises enter a system with the
same µeff throughout the simulation:
µi,t = µi,t−1 − (µeff,t − µeff,t−1), (21)
µeff has a tendency to grow, since according to equation 4 workers tend to move towards
enterprises with a higher margin. The recentering is thus a subtraction and its effect is
that the µi of existing enterprises slowly decline, like an ageing effect; new enterprises may
grow fast because they may have larger margins than the older ones. This recentering is
important for the dynamics of the system: without it, new enterprises would need to start
with a higher and higher margin in order to be able to influence the dynamics of the system
and displace old enterprises. Then, µeff would continue to rise, which is undesired, since
µeff should remain in a (more or less) constant relation to the interest rate, such that the
interest payments represent the same burden for enterprises throughout the simulation.
2.3 The role of heterogeneity and financial constraints in the model
Heterogeneity of µi implies that due to equation (4) enterprises with a higher µi will offer more posts
and therefore grow faster than enterprises with low µi. On its own, this dynamics would at first
form a power law for enterprise sizes, but on the long term converge to a monopoly of the enterprise
with the highest margin. Therefore, µ-heterogeneity needs a counterbalance, constisting in this
model of the renormalization of the margin, interest payments, bankruptcies and the creation of
new enterprises. These mechanisms allow to describe statistical regularities rather than monopoly
formation.
3 Results
In this section we discuss results of simulations corresponding to different sets of parameters of the
model:
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− [µm, µM ], the range of expected margins,
− r, the interest rate,
− γ, the bankruptcy threshold,
− ν, the number of new enterprises entering per iteration.
In all presented settings enterprises compete for demand, whenever unemployment drops to zero,
they compete in addition for workforce (which is not always the case). The wages are fixed w = 30 p
in units of the price of the goods, that are the monetary unit in our simulations. Given Nw, a
number of initially active enterprises Ne is chosen, and their margins µi are drawn at random
within a given interval [µm, µM ]. The number of their employees is chosen respecting some level
of initial unemployment, and the desired initial size distribution. The sum of money in the system
is zero. Enterprises start with ei,t ≈ 0 (except a small random value for debts such that the
bankruptcies of initial enterprises do not occur in a very small timespan). This initialisation does
impact the trajectory of the system, but for the analysis the time long after the start is interesting,
where the system found its steady state and is dominated by the choice of [µm, µM ], r, γ and ν.
3.1 Steady states and parameter dependence
Figure 2 presents results corresponding to a typical time evolution of the system. Even after 2000
iterations there are fluctuations due to the randomness in the system. Job losses do not occur at
a constant rate but fluctuate around a certain rate (here 1% of the existing jobs in one iteration.
In subfigure (c) of figure 2 job losses are averaged over 50 iterations in order to see slower trends,
the actual fluctuations are larger).
The system eventually reaches a steady state, characterized by a number of active enterprises
and a level of unemployment, which depends on the interest rate r of the system, the bankruptcy
threshold γ, the number ν of entering enterprises per iteration and the rannge [µm, µM ]. The higher
the interest rate, the faster the bankruptcy threshold is reached by indebted enterprises, and the
higher needs to be the number of new entries per iteration in order to maintain the same level of
employment. The steady state is noisy since the dynamics has two stochastic elements, but for a
given set of parameters the system converges to such a state for any initial level of unemployment,
any initial size distribution of enterprises, and (almost) any number of initially active enterprises.
The system fluctuates in the steady state for the following two reasons: firstly, since enterprises
spend a part of their profits for interest payments, they cannot spend all their gross profit in the
goods market. Thus, their contribution to the aggregate demand falls short of the one required to
absorb the offer. As a result enterprises are not able to sell their entire production. The profits of
enterprises fluctuate due to the random allocations of demand to every offered good, and so does
their production decision in the next iteration. Notice that in the case of full employment, the
same random allocation holds additionally for the allocation of workers in the job market. The
second reason for fluctuations is due to the random initialization of new enterprises’ margins µi:
depending on its value they grow, decline and incur debts at different speeds, so the job losses due
to bankruptcies fluctuate over time. The system evolution keeps memory of the past trajectory
through the debt distribution among enterprises. Large job losses due to bankruptcies occur in
waves, causing lower demand and therefore on average lower net realized profits for firms. This also
impacts the chances and speed of growth of a new enterprise endowed with a higher net margin.
Fluctuations are discussed more in detail in section 3.3.
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Figure 2: Nw = 10 000, bankruptcy threshold γ = 2, interest rate r=0.011, new enterprises
per iteration ν = 8, [µm, µM ] = [0, 0.1]. Time evolution of (a) unemployment, (b) number of
active enterprises, (c) job losses due to firm bankruptcies (first 1000 iterations, averaged over 50
iterations).
3.2 Lifetime of enterprises
The lifetime of enterprises is limited by the centering of margins (which always decreases the
margins of existing firms) and by the interest payments, which both may lead to bankruptcies.
Figure (3) illustrates the time evolution of two particular enterprises of one simulated system. The
left hand side figures (a) and (c) correspond to an enterprise with large initial µi: µi = 0.078.
Created at iteration t = 490, with ni,0 = 1, it grows during about 100 iterations (figure a) before
starting to decline. It goes bankrupt after 134 periods. The bottom figure shows the evolution of
its margins: centered expected gross margin µi,t, actual gross margin (19) and actual net margin
(20). All the three margins decrease over time, but the net margin decreases faster, reflecting the
interest burden due to interests owed for cumulated loans, which the firm has to pay, up to its
eventual bankruptcy. The fluctuations in the gross and net realized margins reflect the randomness
in the goods market. For a given bankruptcy threshold γ, the higher the interest rate, the shorter
the typical lifetime of enterprises. This has implications on the size and growth rate distribution,
which we trace at every iteration.
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Figure 3: Two examples of enterprises. Their sizes (upper line) and their margin and net margin (lower
line) are plotted over their lifetime. Both arise from the same simulation with the same parameters as in
figure 2 (interest rate r = 0.075, ν = 8, 450 active enterprises, 100000 workers, uniform margin distribution
between 0 and 0.1, bankruptcy threshold γ= 2). The enterprise shown in figures (a) and (c) starts with a
higher µi and grows much bigger, and exits for more iterations than the one shown in (b) and (d).
Size distribution of enterprises. Even though every single enterprise size varies over time as
the typical cases shown in figure 3, the size distribution of enterprises forms a fat tail distribution
that can be approximated by a power law which remains stable (unlike the case without new
enterprises and bankruptcies where the steady state is a monopoly). The stochastic process leading
to this is a superposition of two effects: a stochastic process due to competition for demand (on
its own described in [15]), and the dynamics that each enterprise grows (and later shrinks) over its
lifetime. Depending on r and the number of new enterprises per iteration, the numerically found
exponent of the approximate power law varies between 0.8 and 2. The higher the interest rate and
the number of entries per iteration, the shorter the average lifetime of an enterprise. Only for low
interest rates, this ‘turnover’ is slow enough that certain enterprises have enough time to reach
large sizes, before their renormalized margin makes them less competitive compared to younger
enterprises. For high interest rates the distribution is steeper, i.e. the power law exponent is larger.
An example with a relatively low interest rate is given in figure 4.
Growth rate distribution of enterprises. For a simpler scenario without margin heterogene-
ity, the model provides an explanation for the stylized fact of a tent-shaped growth rate distribution,
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both analytically and in simulations [15]. The necessary ingredient is that enterprises are in com-
petition for a limited quantity (workforce or aggregate demand). Big enterprises add to the peak of
the tent-shaped growth rate distribution, and the small contribute more to the tails. In the setting
of this paper, the growth rate of an enterprise depends (in addition to the randomly attributed
limited sales opportunities) on its expected gross margin via equation (3). Margin heterogeneity
on its own can distort the tent-shaped growth rate distribution. If however the combination of (i)
interest payments, (ii) entry and exit of enterprises, and (iii) recentering of the margin produces a
situation where the big enterprises have a realized net margin that is in the middle of the distri-
bution, we find a tent-shape growth rate distribution. To that aim it is necessary that the growth
dynamics produces a correlation between the average growth rate and size of an enterprise. The
elements (i) – (iii) provide this, as is illustrated in figure 4. The correlation is the following: the
big enterprises cumulate in the middle of the distribution of the net realized margin. They rarely
have very high net realized margins, since it takes them time to grow, and over time their expected
gross margin µi declines. The biggest enterprises are also less represented among the enterprises
with the lowest net realized margins, since these have already lowered their production (according
to equation 3).
The small enterprises are spread all over the distribution of the net margin, so they contribute
to the fat tails of the tent-shaped distribution. Subfigure (d) in figure 4 shows that it must be
indeed small enterprises who have a net realized margin far from the center of the distribution. It
may be noisy due to the randomness in the system.
A case where the tent-shaped growth rate distribution is extremely noisy or nonexistent is when
big enterprises exist with net margins far from the center of the distribution. This can arise from
fluctuations in the initialisation of new enterprises, or from bankruptcy waves. If the competition
among enterprises is removed, e.g. by deficit spending of the bank in combination with temporal
unemployment, the probabilistic dynamics that generated the tent-shaped growth rate distribution
is also removed. In that case, the growth rate distribution adopts, as expected, the same shape as
the number of enterprises per net margin (subfigure (c) in figure 4). The distributions in subfigure
(c) and (d) are centered around a positive value, whereas the growth rate distribution in (a) is
centered around zero, because unemployment is zero, and enterprises face a constraints both in
aggregate demand and in the available workforce. Despite having realized positive net profits they
do not grow on average, because not enough workforce is available.
11
 1
 10
 100
 1000
-0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05  0  0.05  0.1
l o
g  
n u
m
b e
r  o
f  e
n t
e r
p r
i s e
s
growth rate [∆ni/ni] 
(a)
 1
 10
 100
 10  100  1000
n
u
m
b e
r  o
f  e
n t
e r
p r
i s e
s
size of enterprise (bin width: 10 workers)
slope = -1.1
(b)
 0
 2
 4
 6
 8
 10
 12
 14
-0.15 -0.1 -0.05  0  0.05  0.1  0.15
n
u
m
b e
r  o
f  e
n t
e r
p r
i s e
s
net margin
(c)
 0
 500
 1000
 1500
 2000
 2500
 3000
 3500
 4000
-0.12 -0.1 -0.08-0.06-0.04-0.02  0  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08
s i
z e
 o
f  e
n t
e r
p r
i s e
 [ n
i]  
net realized µ of enterprises
(d)
Figure 4: Interest rate 0.075, ν = 4, γ = 2, 100000 workers, ≈ 450 active enterprises, unemployment
is 0. Snapshots after 750 iterations. (a) growth rate distribution of enterprises, (b) size distribution
of enterprises, (c) number of enterprises per net realized margin, (d) size of enterprises vs. net
realized margin (every point represents one enterprise). If enterprises did not face a random
constraint due to limited aggregate demand, every enterprise would grow according to its net
realized margin, and the growth rate distribution (a) would have precisely the shape of the number
of enterprises per net realized margin (c), which is clearly not the case. (d) shows that the dynamics
of interest payments, retstarts, bankruptcies and recentering of the margin causes big enterprises
to appear towards the middle of the net margin distribution, although it is noisy.
3.3 Fluctuations
Stability has been verified by simulating 10 times the system with same parameters and different
randomization, as well as by simulating the same system with different initial conditions. With
respect to that, the system is stable, though atypical cases may in principle arise. For the observed
simulations, after some time fluctuations occur always around the same mean, which is character-
ized by the parameters ν, γ, r and the range of µi. The higher the interest rate and the rate of
new entries per iteration, the faster the system loses the memory of the initial conditions, and the
fluctuations due to the randomness in the system become dominant quickly. Depending on the
width of the distribution of µ, the observed fluctuations can be strong. A rise in unemployment
is caused by some big enterprise going bankrupt. This can be seen in figures 2 and 5 wherever
unemployment rises very fast. Successively, it may rise even further, because other enterprises
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lower their production due to a big lack of demand. Once unemployment starts to decline, this
happens slower than it rose, because it takes time for other enterprises to grow and absorb the
workforce.
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Figure 5: Interest rate r = 0.011, ν = 8, γ = 2, Nw = 100000. Time evolution of unemployment for
two different widths of the µ-distribution. In figure (a), µi for new enterprises are drawn randomly
between 0 and 0.1 (as in the rest of the paper), in figure (b), between 0.025 and 0.075. Two effects
are visible: (i) Unemployment clearly fluctuates more in the system with a larger width of the
µ-distribution. In figure (b), all entering enterprises have more similar growth behaviour and a
more similar lifetime, so unemployment fluctuates less. (ii) Unemployment is higher in (b), since
the highest margin is only 0.075, so compared to the scenario in (a) a smaller fraction of enterprises
has a net realized margin bigger than zero, meaning that only few enterprises will grow and offer
more posts.
Roughly, this is the type of fluctuations that DelliGatti et al. [9] interpret as business fluc-
tuations in their similar model. Since the evolution of the job losses due to bankruptcy is not
explicitely given in their book, we estimate its impact on unemployment to be at least twice as
strong as in the case presented here, based on their bankruptcy frequency and the relation of
enterprises to workers.
Role of Bankruptcy threshold on fluctuations. The lower γ, (i.e. the less debts per hired
worker enterprises can incur before going bankrupt), the less the system fluctuates. For low γ,
enterprises go bankrupt while still growing, at a point of time when their average age and size
are still small. The job losses due to bankruptcy are more evenly spread, and fluctuations have
a lower amplitude and a higher frequency. Workers can be employed by other enterprises faster,
resulting in lower unemployment. Not surprisingly, the lower the bankruptcy threshold, the lower
the aggregate debt of enterprises.
4 Validation of the model
The strength of this model is that it can be compared both to a theory of a firm, as well as give rise
to macroeconomic quantities. On the macroeconomic level, it is possible to analyze distribution of
the size, growth rate, age and debt, as well as aggregate quantities: unemployment, bankruptcy
frequency, productivity increase (via the part by which µeff is recentered). The tent-shaped
growth rate distribution has been widely acknowledged as a stylized fact [17], [10]. For firm size
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distribution, several authors equally propose a Zipf law [16], [18], [8], and the fat-tailed nature of
the distribution is generally accepted. The statistics about debt and age at failure (not presented
in this paper) are qualitatively in agreement with data from the German Statistical Office, and the
conclusions by [12].
The model offers also the possibility to compare tendencies with empirical surveys. For instance,
as A. Coad states in his survey of the literature on firm growth [13] p.12, “there is a lot of evidence
that a slight negative dependence of the growth rate on size is present at various levels of industrial
aggregation.” This effect also occurs in our model: To reach a large size, enterprises need to attain
a certain age. During that time, their margin diminishes due to the recentering of µeff , and
the level of debt will increase, so it is not possible for the net margin of big enterprises to range
among the higher end of the distribution. Small enterprises, in turn, are more likely to have a net
margin above average: Of the enterprises with negative net margin, a part goes bankrupt, and
evidently cannot enter the statistics on average growth rates, so the average growth rate is shifted
towards a positive value of growth. A second tendency produced by the model has empirically
been found by [17]: The width of the tent-shape of the growth rate distribution depends on the
enterprise sizes that are considered. If only the big enterprises are considered, the distribution is
much narrower than if it is computed for a sample of small enterprises. However, a certain range of
sizes is necessary. If only enterprises of precisely the same size add to the growth rate distribution,
our model would produce its shape to be Gaussian.
The parameters in the model are all relative, i.e. there is no specific meaning what timespan
is described by one iteration. Roughly one month could be the order of magnitude. The type
of analysis in this paper is rather suited to understand dependencies, and to tackle the question
how much randomness a system has or should have, with respect to the deterministic part of the
dynamics. The relative weight of these two elements is visualized in trajectories of the expected
and net µ shown in figure 3.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an agent-based model linking statistical regularities of macroeconomic
systems to characteristics of single firms. This is done by combining a well understood simpler
model in a forthcoming paper [15] with new features, in a way that preserves the mechanisms
and thus the arising statistical regularities. The new elements are heterogeneous margins, interest
payments, bankruptcies and recentering of the margin of firms, reflecting an ‘ageing process’.
Altogether, the system exhibits a fat tail size distribution (which can be approximated by a power
law), a tent-shape growth rate distribution as well as fluctuations in unemployment, in aggregate
debt level and in the number of active enterprises. These fluctuations can be interpreted as business
fluctuations. Other possible ways to describe business fluctuations with this model would be to
vary some parameters that are currently fixed, such as the effective margin (reflecting the profit
margins), the interest rate or the frequency of new entries of enterprises, in order to reproduce a
specific situation observed in the real world.
Finally we would like to point out some interesting problems for which this model can be useful:
(1) More extended comparisons to data are in progress for growth rates and bankruptcies, but are
possible for other quantities such as credit constraints. (2) In the model presented here, the margin
of one enterprise is cannot be influenced by its own behaviour throughout an enterprise’s lifetime.
Productivity increase happens thus only via the creation of new enterprises. A possible extension
of the model would be to let the margin of an enterprise depend on its investments, as is done
in [9], or by purchasing production goods that depreciate over time as [7]. This would allow for
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enterprises to take strategic choices and to have more variable lifecycles. (3) The financial sector
is very simplified in the model. Decisions of the bank depending on its own balance sheet are
not present, as well as variable interest rates or more than one bank, which seems a promising
extension in order to study more in detail the role of credit.
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